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Consider the following statements: first, a “psychological theory deserving any consideration 
must furnish an explanation of ‘memory’” (Freud, 1895, p. 299); and second, “Hysterics 
suffer mainly from reminiscences” (Breuer and Freud, 1893-95, p. 7). Taken from among 
Freud’s earliest works, these statements point to a new and different experience of time based 
on the temporalisation of the unconscious. Freud outlined the latter, initially, in the Project 
for a Scientific Psychology, relying on the model of hysteria to articulate the theory of 
repressed memories: “We invariably find that a memory is repressed which has only become 
a trauma by deferred action [nur nachträglich]” (1895, p. 356). We are, in many respects, still 
taking the measure of these inaugural statements, estimating the scope of Freud’s 
contribution in the wider context of what we know about human memory. My paper is a 
contribution to this ongoing work of critical inquiry. It comprises a close reading of some of 
Freud’s key texts on the theory of memory, as well as a consideration of contemporary 
contributions to the following themes: (a) the concept of “mnemic-trace” (Erinnerungsrest); 
(b) the relationship between memory and the uncanny; and (c) the role of conviction in our 
sense of the past. 
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What is one doing when one remembers? The criterion of action proves decisive in 
approaching the problem of memory. I argue in this paper that memory is the doing of a 
certain kind of action. Freud conceptualised the distinction between “memory” and “action,” 
most notably, in his paper “Remembering, Repeating, and Working-Through” (1914). In 
response to repetitive enactment, understood as a disavowal of past experience, Freud (1914, 
p. 148) assigned analysis the task of filling in “gaps in memory” and, thereby, overcoming 
“resistances due to repression.” The paper demarcates the descriptive and the dynamic 
aspects of the analytic task, respectively. Looked at from the point of view of action, the 
model appears to be one-sided. The analyst’s capacity to “uncover” the resistances which are 
unknown to the patient defines the work of therapeutic action. According to Freud (1914, p. 
147), “when [the resistances] have been got the better of, the patient often relates the 
forgotten situations and connections without any difficulty.” The active part of the analytic 
encounter is confined to the interpretative efforts of the analyst, while the patient seemingly 
recalls the hitherto repressed memories in an essentially passive mode. 
 I think the idea of a passive relation to the remembered past is incorrect. I propose an 
alternative conception of memory based on “imaginative elaboration” (Winnicott, 1988, p. 19 
et passim). In order to differentiation active and passive types of memory, I shall call them re-
descriptive memory and recollective memory, respectively. Neisser (1967) identified a type 
of recollective memory in which accurate copies of lived experience are retained (recorded) 
in the mind, only to “reappear,” more or less intact, at some later date. The “reappearance 
hypothesis” thus accounts for recollective memory. Neisser differentiated this view from 
what we might call the “reconstructive” hypothesis, which allows that one’s sense of the past 
is actively reconstructed “out of” the limited remnants of mnemic-experience: “Out of a few 
stored bone chips, we remember a dinosaur” (Neisser, 1967, p. 285). Neisser’s point is well 
taken: our memories may be reconstructed “out of” rather scant, fragmentary sensible 
impressions. In any case, the idea that memory involves a type of imaginative work draws 
attention to the use that one makes of the past. It emphasises what one does in the act of 
remembering. Re-descriptive memory thus presupposes an active, imaginative reclamation of 
past experience, a mnemic act as distinct from mere recollection. 
 The scope of re-descriptive memory may be taken up in various ways. In the 
neurobiology of memory, for example, there is a longstanding debate about the match 
between systems of encoding and retrieval as a condition of the remembered past.1 Suffice it 
here to note the following points in light of this debate. Firstly, Daniel Schacter (1996, p. 56) 
advances the principle claim that long-term personal (autobiographical) memories are “built 
on our elaborations,” that the formation of memory depends, largely, on the process of 
retrieval. Secondly, the contemporary view in neuroscience amounts to a “mixed model” of 
recollection and reconstruction. The model comprises a previously encoded network of 
neural activity on the one hand and, on the other, a distinct pattern of neural connections 
(“another pattern of activity”) activated or aroused by contemporary stimuli. Thirdly, 
assuming there is no such thing as an “uncontaminated record” of the past; that memories are 
not “accurately retrievable” (Sprengnether, 2018, p. 155) from our early childhood – it would 
be misleading, therefore, to think of our imaginative sense of the past as somehow “flawed” 
or subject to “error.” To speak of the “inaccuracies” or “imperfections” of memory 
presupposes that “there could be a more accurate, veridical version of the past if only we 
were able to reach it…But the personal history that our memory constructs is not an 
approximation to some real truth that regrettably eludes us. It is all we have and all we can 
ever have. Its indeterminate quality is, in fact, the very thing that enables our psychic growth” 
(Parsons, 2014, p. 45). I shall come back to the idea of “incompletion” as a structural 
determinate of psychological development. Meanwhile, there are two options available to us: 
a soft version of the encoding/retrieval debate in neurobiology posits a mixed model of 
“recollective” and “productive” memory (to borrow the Kantian terms); a hard version, posits 
the metaphorical or fictive nature of autobiographical memory. I intend to defend a hard 
version of the constructive hypothesis on psychoanalytical grounds. 
 Neuroscientific research presents a challenge to Freud’s archaeological analogy. 
Freud (1899, p. 303) maintained that while the earliest years of childhood are subject to a 
type of forgetting (“amnesia”), nonetheless, “fragmentary recollections” of those early years 
remain intact as “memory-traces.” This assumption is called into question by the 
disconcerting finding that our self-narratives are not based on the simple “reappearance” of 
sensible impressions. Freud’s view of memory, however, is far more complicated than I am 
making it sound. Essentially, Freud advanced two accounts of the remembered past, one 
based on repressed but retrievable memories, the other on a constructive-reconstructive 
horizon of intelligibility. The archaeological metaphor admits two contrasting images of the 
past, one based on the indestructability of historical life, the other on the imaginative 
elaboration of time past. And as I intend to demonstrate, reconstructive memory yields a 
sense of conviction; remembering is a way of making the past believable. 
 
 
1 See Semon (1923) for the differentiated stages of recollective experience – including, encoding (“engraphy”), 
the mnemic-trace (“engram”), and retrieval or the mnemic-act (“ecphory”); and Lashley’s (1950) classic paper 
for an elaboration on the representation of a memory in the brain. More recently, Tulving (1983) and Tulving 
and Thomson (1973) have advanced two important views, first, that encoding is the major determinant of the 
trace or trait, and second, that recollection depends to a large extent on the match between the original encoding 
and the retrieval cues or hints. For a more general overview of the neuroscientific literature, see Holland and 
Kensinger (2010); see Sprengnether (2018) on the significance of the neural basis of memory systems for post-
Freudian theories of memory. 
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We can retrace the conceptual trajectory of Freud’s contrasting theses on memory from the 
neurological metaphor in the 1895 Project through the re-descriptive nature of memory in 
“Screen Memories” (1899) to the scriptural metaphor, the analogy of psyche and apparatus, 
employed in “A Note upon the ‘Mystic Writing-Pad’” (1925). Freud first defined what he 
saw as the fundamental problem of memory in the 1895 Project – namely, how to represent 
memory in terms of the psychical mechanisms of receptivity and retention. How does the 
mind store memories while, at the same time, making fresh additions possible? This problem 
persists throughout Freud’s work from beginning to end. The Project is a dense and difficult 
text. Essentially, however, the initial solution that Freud came up with in the Project rests on 
the Ԛη theory, the hypothesis of contact-barriers, and two kinds of neurones. Together, these 
foundational conceptual hypotheses describe the breaking open of a “path” (Bahn) and the 
possible accumulation of Ԛη. The latter, Freud (1895, p. 298) argues, “is made possible by 
the assumption of resistances which oppose discharge; and the structure of neurones makes it 
probable that the resistances are all to be located in the contacts [between one neurone and 
another], which in this way assume the value of barriers.” 
 Freud (1895, p. 300) expands on the basic distinction, with regards to “permeable 
neurones (offering no resistance and retaining nothing), which serve for perception [without 
memory], and impermeable ones (loaded with resistance, and holding back Ԛη), which are 
the vehicles of memory.” In the case of the former, Ԛη passes through a neurone or from one 
neurone to another (“Ԛ flow”), with the result that “the passage of excitation” leaves no trace 
or impression. The “current” passes through as though the neurones possess no contact-
barriers; they appear to offer no resistance of any kind to Ԛ flow. By contrast, where contact-
barriers oppose the quantity of excitation, or where they make themselves felt, Ԛη therefore 
passes only “with difficulty or partially”; hence “a cathected neurone filled with a certain Ԛη” 
(1895, p. 298). In this case, neurones may, “after each excitation, be in a different state from 
before and they thus afford a possibility of representing memory” (1895, p. 299). 
 It is the difference between breaches that accounts for the origin of human memory in 
the Ԛη theory: “in relation to the passage of an excitation, memory is evidently one of the 
powers which determine and direct its pathway, and, if facilitation were everywhere equal, it 
would not be possible to see why one pathway should be preferred 
[Wegbevorzugung]…memory is represented by the differences in the facilitation between the 
ѱ neurones” (1895, p. 300). Breaching (Bahung) operates as the pivotal concept here. The 
problem of memory, as Freud defines it, reveals the extent to which psyche may be seen as a 
relationship of forces manifest as the difference between breaches. 
 I shall come back in a moment to Freud’s revision of the Ԛη theory. But first I want to 
draw attention to another key concept in Freud’s analysis of memory – namely, “screen 
memories.” Freud first introduced this concept in a paper written in 1899; having embarked 
on his self-analysis in the summer of 1897, he was engaged in a series of problems 
concerning the nature of memory per se, as well as normal and pathological types of amnesia, 
and, in particular, the relationship between the amnesia covering the early years of childhood 
and infantile sexuality. The paper itself is based on a “recollection” that Freud attributes to 
one of his patients; in fact, it is a thinly disguised autobiographical memory. 
 The paper is effectively presented in two parts. Starting with a general theoretical 
overview, Freud rehearses the repression-recollection model of memory. This is followed by 
a detailed analysis of an autobiographical screen memory, which, it seems to me, takes things 
in the alternative direction of a construction-conviction model of memory. The role of 
repression in the formation of memories is summarily set out, with respect to the “remarkable 
choice” that memory makes among the elements of early childhood experience. The “choice” 
consists in the retention of seemingly “trivial” or “indifferent” elements and the repression of 
what is most significant or “noteworthy.” The summary account proceeds with the idea that 
the repressed aspects of the event are “omitted rather than forgotten.” Based on this view, 
Freud (1899, p. 306) proffers analytic treatment as a means of “uncovering the missing 
portions” of childhood memories. This is seen as proof of the fact that, when the seemingly 
indifferent “impression” is “restored to completeness,” it thereby reveals the significance of 
our recollections. Freud completes the summary by furnishing the clinical description with a 
theoretical explanation based on the notion of unconscious conflict. 
 A screen memory, therefore, is seen as the result of a “compromise” between “two 
psychical forces,” one of which retains the “indifferent” event in memory while the other 
resists what is unacceptable or “objectionable” to consciousness: “These two opposing forces 
do not cancel each other out, nor does one of them…overpower the other. Instead, a 
compromise is brought about…What is recorded as a mnemic image is not the relevant 
experience itself – in this respect the resistance gets its way; what is recorded is another 
psychical element closely associated with the objectionable one – and in this respect the first 
principle shows its strength, the principle which endeavours to fix important impressions by 
establishing reproducible mnemic images” (1899, p. 307). The explanation rests on the idea 
of “substitution involving a compromise,” whereby the unacceptable is “displaced” 
(transferred, transported) onto the retrievable. Through the psychical mechanism of 
“condensation” the retentive work of the mnemic image holds the psychic tension between 
the memorable and the unacceptable, between its own innocuous content and a repressed 
sexual content. 
 We are familiar with this account of sexual repression and neurotic conflict, an 
account, that is, in which the defence is set against the internal processes of drives, affects, 
and representations. There is, however, more to the paper on “screen memories” than an 
articulation of the repression-recollection model. Most notably, it shows that from as early as 
1899, Freud had already laid the conceptual ground for a “constructivist” theory of memory. 
This is evident in the second half of the paper, where Freud’s presents an autobiographical 
memory. The memory dates from Freud’s early childhood, before the age of three and a half 
years, and includes a bucolic scene in which he recalls playing in a meadow with his nephew 
and niece, John and Pauline, before the family moved from Freiberg to Manchester, and 
before Freud’s own family relocated from Freiberg to Leopoldstadt. We are offered 
something of a fairy-tale, “an uncontaminated state of pristine nature prior to the Fall” 
(Whitebook, 2017, p. 79). 
 The details of the memory need not concern us here. Rather, I want to draw attention 
to what Freud has to say here about the formation of memory. The scene seems not to have 
recurred in Freud’s memory periodically since his childhood. The “recollection” is stirred up, 
initially, when at the age of sixteen (a year younger than reported in the paper), Freud 
returned to Freiberg for the first time to spend his summer holidays with the Fluss family. 
One of the daughters of this family, Gisela, who was three years younger than Freud, came to 
his attention: “I fell immediately in love…I kept it completely secret. After a few days the 
girl went off to her school…and it was this separation after such a short acquaintance that 
brought my longings to a really high pitch. I passed many hours in solitary walks through the 
lovely woods that I had found once more and spent my time building castles in the air. These, 
strangely enough, were not concerned with the future but sought to improve the past” (1899, 
p. 313). His fantasies and longings encapsulate the retrospective-prospective movement of 
psychic time, in which the unlived life (“to improve the past”) comes to the fore as a fictional 
construct of autobiographical memory. It is the fictional narrative, the creative imperative to 
relive the past in accordance with a primordial sense of hopefulness, that renders the 
“recollection” meaningful as a memory. Jones (1954, p. 28) provides the requisite oedipal 
interpretation: “The love episode with [Gisela], and the unconscious erotic phantasy that 
accompanied it, must have re-animated the infantile rape phantasy [defloration] concerning 
Pauline (and, doubtless, ultimately his mother also).” 
 The “recollection” has yet to emerge as a fully formed memory, however. Freud thus 
recounts a second occasion which shapes the “impressions” of the Alpine scene. At the age of 
nineteen (again, a year younger than reported in the paper) Freud visited his half-brother, 
Emanuel, and his family in Manchester, where, as we have seen, they had settled after 
leaving Freiberg. During the visit he was reacquainted with the two children who appear 
alongside him in the screen memory. And while on this occasion he does not fall in love 
(with Pauline), nonetheless, he learns that his father and his uncle “had concocted a plan by 
which I was to exchange the abstruse subject of my [university] studies for one of more 
practical value, settle down, after my studies were completed, in the place where my uncle 
lived, and marry my cousin’ (1899, 314). With the passage of time, the affective threads of 
memory and hope move closer together under the verdict of longing. Jones (1954, pp. 28-29) 
describes how Freud, “[w]hen faced with the difficulty of finding a livelihood in 
Vienna…often reflected on this second, lost opportunity of an easier life and thought that 
there had been much to be said for his father’s plan.” 
 Jones helps us to see what is going on here by referring to the repetition of “lost 
opportunity.” Our attention is thus directed to the act of temporal recovery – most notably, 
the act of narration – as a repeated response to primordial loss. In effect, Gisela Fluss and 
Freud’s niece Pauline are identified with each other in a construction that rests on the mnemic 
trace of an “unlived life,” rather than a sensible impression of a so-called original experience. 
The construction reveals the thought that had one married this or that girl, one’s life “would 
have become much pleasanter” (Freud, 1899, p. 317). There is more to the thought than 
rueful reflection, however. The “unlived life” is also an “internal image” of the archaic, 
preoedipal past, the reclamation of which – according to Proust’s (1972, p. 472) “vast 
dimension which I had not known myself to possess” – provides our memories with 
increasing depth and meaning. The novel (pre-eminently in Proust) exemplifies the 
transformative act of memory, and I suspect that our subjective feelings toward the past 
provide the clearest overlap between psychoanalysis and literature. À la recherche du temps 
perdu redefines the experience of time. For Proust, the past figures first as irretrievable loss – 
“It is a labour in vain to attempt to recapture it: all the efforts of our intellect must prove 
futile” (1976, p. 57); and secondly, as a work of reclamation, the immoderate prolongation of 
“the dimension of Time,” Marcel’s “monsters” or “giants” plunged into the living past (1972, 
p. 474). 
 We can see the same model of narrative temporality, the same imaginative experience 
of time, at work in Freud. On the one hand, Freud’s adolescent love for Gisela reveals a 
longing for “primary love” (Balint, 1937). A myth of origins is thus inscribed in the screen 
memory: “On looking back [Freud] attributed his infatuation to Gisela’s black hair and eyes 
and to the deeply moved state of mind that this visit to his birthplace had induced. It was 
evidently not the girl’s charms themselves, since he commented on his lack of taste; he also 
said that he never exchanged a single word with her. So it was love of some internal image of 
his own plainly derived from far deeper sources but associated with his early home” (Jones, 
1954, p. 36 n 3). On the other hand, the childhood memory is constructed by an imaginative 
projection of two longed-for fantasies of marriage and prosperity – i.e., “deflowering a girl” 
and “material comfort” (Freud, 1899, p. 318) – on to one another. Crucially, Freud (1899, p. 
315) himself hints at the imaginative nature of his memory: “people often construct such 
things unconsciously – almost like works of fiction.” 
 Is the qualification of memory’s fictional nature warranted? It would appear that 
Freud believed so. The authenticity of the remembered past, the early childhood scene, is 
maintained on the grounds that while we “select” a given memory as psychically homologous 
to subsequent experiences and fantasies, the memories themselves are nonetheless perfectly 
genuine. They are conceived as memories of a past reality. Freud (1899, p. 316) duly arrives 
at his definition of a “screen memory” – a “recollection whose value lies in the fact that it 
represents in the memory impressions and thoughts of a later date whose content is connected 
with its own by symbolic or similar links.” Transforming itself into childhood memories, 
fantasy thereby extends the reach for meaning to unconscious thoughts; in particular, it 
disguises the explicit sexual element (“gross sexual aggression”) by means of more 
acceptable content. Freud believed that it is possible for repressed fantasies to “slip away into 
a childhood scene” only insofar as the impressions left by the original event meet the 
fantasies halfway. In this respect, the mnemic trace provides a surface of emergence for the 
disguised fantasy, which, in turn, subjects the original scene to a degree of distortion. For 
Freud the subjective nature of the latter does not cast the objectivity of the scene itself into 
doubt. 
 Let us take stock of the situation regarding the vital elements of the past. Based on the 
notion of “screen memories,” remembering may be broken down into its component parts – 
namely, the mnemic trace, the mnemic act, and the mnemic image. First, while insisting on 
the authenticity of the original scene, Freud (1899, p. 322) adds that “the raw material of 
memory-traces…remains unknown to us in its original form.” The primal form of mnemic-
experience is accessible only in its effects. Secondly, the transformation from primary 
impression (the unconscious mnemic trace) to representational image involves the doing of a 
certain kind of action. For Freud the mnemic act results in “falsifications of memory,” 
largely, due to the logic of repression; but he also allows for other motives, indeed, with no 
greater regard for “historical accuracy.” Our sense of the past depends on the imaginative 
elaboration of the mnemic act, which constitutes the groundwork of memory. Thirdly, the 
mnemic image is a repetition, but not “an exact repetition of the impression that was 
originally received.” The mnemic image does not correspond to the actual facts of early 
childhood distinct from imaginative elaboration; the so-called original impression is already 
“worked over” by the productive imagination. 
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Despite his explicit claims to the contrary, I believe Freud conceptualised a past that has 
never been present. This is my main argument. It is incumbent on me therefore to substantiate 
the principal claim that the remembered past is essentially an imaginative construct. Let us 
pick up the threads of the Ԛη theory. In a letter to Fliess, written three years before the 
publication of “Screen Memories,” Freud (cited in Masson, 1985, pp. 207-208) announced a 
momentous shift in his thinking, a shift that redefined the act of remembering not only as a 
structure of delay (Nachträglichkeit) but also as a type of “writing.” The letter effectively 
cleared the ground for a reformulation of the entire system of the Project. In particular, it 
announced the prospect of a “new psychology” – including, a theory of perception and (at 
least) three modes of registration. Recourse to the vocabulary of “registration” 
(Niederschrift), “transcription” (Umschrift), and “sign” (Zeichen) placed the psychoanalytical 
theory of memory on a new footing. It also redefined the parameters for the experience of 
time. 
 This brings us to another key text. Further to the theoretical advance achieved in the 
1895 Project, Freud sought to consolidate the metaphor of “writing,” and the concomitant 
analogy of “psyche” and “apparatus,” in his paper “A Note upon the ‘Mystic Writing-Pad’” 
(1925). Its brevity notwithstanding, the paper is among Freud’s most important contributions 
to the psychoanalysis of time. The Mystic Writing-Pad (der Wunderblock) is a children’s toy, 
a writing machine, consisting of a slab of dark resin or wax with a paper edging, on top of 
which rests a thin transparent sheet comprising two layers, an upper layer of transparent 
celluloid and a lower layer of thin translucent waxed paper. While the upper sheet is fixed in 
place, the lower layer however can be moved. It requires two hands to operate the device, 
which consists in scratching or scoring the surface layer of celluloid with a stylus, writing 
without ink, and thus pressing the lower surface of the waxed paper onto the wax slab. This 
produces legible marks (“dark writing”) on the otherwise smooth whitish-grey sheet of 
celluloid. In order to “destroy” what has been rendered visible, to make the legible illegible, 
one need only lift the double covering-sheet from the wax slab; the impressions now 
disappear and, indeed, do not re-appear when the two surfaces come together once more. 
 Freud (1925, p. 230), however, was intrigued by a further aspect of the device – 
namely, while the surface of the Mystic Pad may be clear, “it is easy to discover that the 
permanent trace of what was written is retained upon the wax slab itself and is legible in 
suitable lights.” We can now see how the Mystic Pad models the basic problem of memory. 
The mechanical device affords Freud (1925, p. 230) a perfect analogy of “two separate but 
interrelated component parts or systems” – that is, a “receptive surface” together with a 
“protective shield” (the layer of celluloid) and “permanent traces” comprising legible 
meanings. The analogy allows Freud to posit a radically new theory of memory. In particular, 
further to the intentional horizon of reference, treated by Husserl (1966) as a pattern of 
recollections and expectations (“retention” and “protentions”), Freud conceived the problem 
of memory increasingly in scriptural terms. In effect, the 1925 paper carried Freud beyond 
the phenomenological notion of horizon, including, the past-oriented and future-oriented 
parts of the horizon pertaining to the act of perception. 
 Freud (1925, p. 228) continued to remodel what he saw as the essential problem of 
memory – how to account for an “unlimited receptive capacity for new perceptions” and, at 
the same time, for the retention of “permeant memory-traces” of those perceptions. And he 
now explicitly ruled out forms of supplementary memory, or substitutes for memory (paper, 
slate), where one or other of the basic criteria (receptivity and retention) is not met. Further to 
which he presented the Mystic Pad as analogous to his conception of the perceptual apparatus 
(the system Pcpt.-Cs.). The model allows for the idea that perceptions are received but not 
retained. At the same time, Freud (1925, p. 228) notes that “the permanent traces of the 
excitations which have been received are preserved in ‘mnemic systems’ [the Ucs.] lying 
behind the perceptual system.” The work of memory takes place in “adjoining systems” 
alongside the receptive surface; most importantly, the impressions left in the mnemic systems 
are not susceptible to erasure. The Pad thus offers an image of indestructibility pertaining 
below the surface play of appearance and disappearance – operating, that is, at a deeper level 
than “the flickering-up [Aufleuchten] and passing-away [Vergehen] of consciousness in the 
process of perception” (1925, p. 231). 
 What does this mean for our understanding of time and memory? The radical 
implications of the scriptural analogy are the topic of Derrida’s celebrated commentary on 
Freud’s paper. Derrida (1966, p. 221) shows how Freud approached the problem of memory 
in three progressive stages, with increasing “rigour, inwardness, and differentiation.” I have 
noted these stages summarily in my initial description of the Mystic Pad, starting with the 
consideration of writing as “a technique subservient to memory, an external, auxiliary 
technique of psychical memory which is not memory itself” (Derrida, 1966, p. 221). Freud 
does not necessarily explore the implications of the “exteriority” of memory. Nevertheless, 
the initial reference to auxiliary apparatuses (Hilfsapparate) raises the question of artificial or 
prosthetic memory, and as such recalls the distinction between hypomnēsis and mnēmē in the 
Phaedrus. Plato’s attack is levelled not at memory per se so much as “the substitution of the 
mnemonic device for live memory,” the substitution of “the passive, mechanical ‘by-heart’ 
for the active reanimation of knowledge, for its reproduction in the present” (Derrida, 1968b, 
p. 108). Writing enters the fray at this point: “The space of writing, space as writing, is 
opened up in the violent movement of this surrogation, in the difference between the mnēmē 
and hypomnēsis. The outside is already within the work of memory. The evil slips in within 
the relation of memory to itself, in the general organisation of the mnesic activity” (1968b, p. 
109). In a classical play of purity and danger, the metaphysical endorsement of “living 
memory” casts the whole idea of metaphorical memory under the heading of defilement: 
“Memory is…contaminated by its first substitution: hypomnēsis. But what Plato dreams of is 
a memory with no sign. That is, with no supplement. A mnēmē with no hypomnēsis, no 
pharmakon” (1968b, p. 109). The Romantic longings of modernity, not least of all, in certain 
versions of psychoanalysis, retain the evaluative fact of “spontaneity” as a given. 
 In the first place, however, it is simply “a question of considering the conditions 
which customary writing surfaces impose on the operation of mnemic supplementation” 
(Derrida, 1966, pp. 222). In this respect, the model does not address the essential problem of 
memory that carries over from the Project: weighing the different properties of a sheet of 
paper and a slate, Freud (1925, pp. 227-228) concludes that “an unlimited receptive capacity 
and a retention of permanent traces seem to be mutually exclusive properties in the apparatus 
which we use for our memory: either the receptive surface must be renewed or the note must 
be destroyed.” The critical evaluation of “customary writing surfaces” reveals the extent to 
which “Freud, like Plato…continues to oppose hypomnemic writing and writing en tei 
psychei, itself woven of traces, empirical memories of a present truth outside of time” 
(Derrida, 1966, p. 227). The Freudian interpretation remains limited by the opposition of 
“interiority” and “exteriority”; hence the “Platonic” closure of Freudianism. Nevertheless, the 
second analogy goes further than a mere acknowledgment of an aide-mémoire: “If we lift the 
entire covering-sheet…off the wax slab, the writing vanishes and…does not re-appear again. 
The surface of the Mystic Pad is clear of writing and once more capable of receiving 
impressions. But it is easy to discover that the permanent trace of what was written is retained 
upon the wax slab itself and is legible in suitable lights” (Freud, 1925, p. 230). The 
contradictory criteria dating from the Project, namely, “a receptive surface that can be used 
over and over again” (like a slate) and the retention or “permanent traces of what has been 
written” (like a sheet of paper), are met by a double system. The Mystic Pad thus “solves the 
problem of combining two functions by dividing them between two separate but interrelated 
component parts or systems” (1925, p. 230; emphasis in the original). Despite the persistent 
underlying opposition between psychical and metaphorical memory, the whole of psyche (not 
just the perceptual layer) can be modelled according to the second analogy. 
 The scriptural model comprises a third and final analogy, which is not only the most 
far-reaching aspect of Freud’s theory of memory, but also a defining example of his 
metaphorical thinking in general. As I mentioned in my initial summary, Freud (1925, pp. 
230-231) compares “the celluloid and waxed paper cover with the system Pcpt.Cs. and its 
protective shield, the wax slab with the unconscious behind them.” Furthermore, Freud 
(1925, p. 231) goes on to admit the temporality of the wax slab, “the appearance and 
disappearance of the writing,” which he compares to “the flickering-up [Aufleuchten] and 
passing-away [Vergehen] of consciousness in the process of perception.” The alternating of 
the visible and invisible – i.e., the legible and illegible determinations of meaning – admits 
the phenomenon of active, psychic time in conjunction with “the multiplicity of sensitive 
layers.” 
 It remains for us to explore the possibilities that Freud brought into view by means of 
the scriptural analogy, or the resemblance of artificial memory to human memory. In fact, 
Freud (1925, p. 231) himself pressed the analogy yet further: “On the Mystic Pad the writing 
vanishes every time the close contact is broken between the paper which receives the 
stimulus and the wax slab which preserves the impression. This agrees with a notion which I 
have long had about the method by which the perceptual apparatus of our mind functions, but 
which I have hitherto kept to myself.” The concept of time is predicated on periodic erasure, 
the idea that consciousness fades each time the cathexis is withdrawn and the contact is 
broken. The basic intuition of “discontinuity” extends from the 1895 Project and Freud’s 
letters to Flies through Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920) to the paper under 
consideration. There are any number of ways to reconstruct this line of thinking. I shall limit 
myself, here, to three propositions on memory. 
 First, the opposition of psyche and apparatus is not sustainable on empirical grounds. 
Freud (1925, p. 230) simultaneously announced and resisted this possibility, relying on the 
full support and authority of tradition for his resistance: “There must come a point at which 
the analogy between an auxiliary apparatus [Hilfsapparate] of this kind [the Mystic Pad] and 
the organ which is its prototype will cease to apply. It is true, too, that once the writing has 
been erased, the Mystic Pad cannot ‘reproduce’ it from within; it would be a mystic pad 
indeed if, like our memory, it could accomplish that.” Derrida (1966, p. 227) situates the 
Freudian opposition of psych and apparatus, the interiority of “live memory” and “a dead 
complexity without depth,” in the Cartesian context of space and mechanics, but also (once 
again) in the tradition of Plato and the opposition of hypomnēsis and mnēmē. Moreover, he 
maintains that given his acknowledgement of the irreducible “unity of life and death,” Freud 
certainly had the conceptual wherewithal to overcome the dichotomy and, thereby, to expose 
so-called “empirical memories” to the rule of metaphor. Generally, the possibility of undoing 
its own binary oppositions is integral to the Freudian interpretation, which, in this case, 
means that the sense of the past cannot be exhausted by psychology alone, but has to take 
cognisance of the exteriority of mechanical models and archival apparatuses (metaphorical 
memory) as well as the “natural wax” (so to speak) of physical memory. Spontaneity is, at 
once, gestural and metaphorical. 
 Second, the mnemic-trace operates through the registration of its own erasure. Freud 
(1925, p. 232) advanced this proposition in terms of “representation” (die Vorstellung): “If 
we imagine one hand writing upon the surface of the Mystic Writing-Pad while another 
periodically raises its covering-sheet from the wax slab, we shall have a concrete 
representation of the way in which I tried to picture the functioning of the perceptual 
apparatus of our mind.” The work of remembering registers that which it represses and 
disavows. Derrida (1966, p. 226) underlines the extent to which mnemic-traces, “in the 
‘present’ of their first impression” (the “original” impression of the senses), are determined 
and formed by “the double force of repetition and erasure.” 
 Third, metaphor constitutes a past that has never been present. In terms of the Mystic 
Pad, metaphor applies to “the analogy between two apparatuses” (psychical and non-
psychical) and “the possibility of this representational relation.” The recourse to metaphor 
raises a question which, as Derrida (1966, p. 228) points out, Freud, “despite his premises, 
and for reasons which are no doubt essential…failed to make explicit, at the very moment 
when he had brought this question to the threshold of being thematic and urgent.” The 
question of non-psychical mnemic iteration – the reproducibility of fragmentary impressions 
of the senses (sensible impression) – presents us with the most rigorous and uncompromising 
expression of possibility in Freud’s discourse: “Metaphor as a rhetorical or didactic device is 
possible here only through the solid metaphor, the ‘unnatural,’ historical production of a 
supplementary machine, added to the psychical organization in order to supplement its 
finitude…The historico-technical production of this metaphor which survives individual (that 
is, generic) psychical organization, is of an entirely different order than the production of an 
intrapsychical metaphor…Here the question of technology…may not be derived from an 
assumed opposition between the psychical and the nonpsychical, life and death. Writing, 
here, is technē as the relation between life and death, between present and representation, 
between the two apparatuses” (1966, p. 228). 
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Freud maintained that conscious recollections relating to our childhood, are in fact distortions 
or “screens” that conceal aspects of our experience. Far from a static reproduction of 
something that happened in the past, childhood memories are viewed as so many fantasy-
based confabulations, the disturbing aspects of which are disguised by more acceptable 
wishes. Freud set the scene for this more active conception of recollective experience not 
only in “Screen Memoires” but also in his agon with “aesthetics” in “The ‘Uncanny’” (1919). 
Memory is played out in disturbing but vital ways in uncanny experience; before turning to 
the relationship between memory and the uncanny, let me retrace my steps. When Freud 
(1899, p. 318) tells us that “the childhood scene itself…undergoes changes” in the act of 
remembering, that the retrieval situation actively contributes to the meaning of time past, and 
that “falsifications of memory may be brought about in this way” – he is drawing attention to 
the fundamental paradox pertaining to autobiographical memory. The past event (in this case, 
the childhood scene) is not necessarily fictitious but exists in memory only by fictional 
means. The distinction between “screen memories” and “other memories derived from our 
childhood” breaks down, at this point, in dramatic terms: “It may indeed be questioned 
whether we have any memories at all from our childhood: memories relating to our childhood 
may be all that we possess’ (1899, p. 322; emphasis in the original). This strikes me as among 
Freud’s most radical findings. 
 The privileging of memories “relating to…” casts the relationship between “personal 
identity” and “historical life” (Schechtman, 1996) in an entirely new light. The mediation of 
memory and reality by fiction – the “falsification of memory” – is acknowledged as an 
inevitable but perturbing phenomenon of psychic life. We can summarise the disturbance on 
two counts. First, “screen memories” confirm the extent to which past events in general are 
subject to imaginative elaboration. Second, the inclusion of “the uncanny” (das Unheimliche) 
as part of the mnemic-act increases the perturbing effect of psychic time by suspending the 
relation between “imagination” and “reality” – “an uncanny effect is often and easily 
produced when the distinction between imagination and reality is effaced” (Freud, 1919, p. 
244). Essentially, the uncanny denotes something strangely familiar that cannot be 
remembered. Freud (1901: 265) presented a clear formulation of the perturbation of memory, 
along these lines, in The Psychopathology of Everyday Life, insisting that “what is looked for 
is never remembered.” 
 The connection between memory and the uncanny accounts for a disquieting sense of 
strangeness – including, a “feeling of derealisation” (Entfremdungsgefühl) – that extends 
from our sense of the past to our sense of self. In a late contribution to the conceptual 
itinerary under discussion, Freud (1936, p. 246) describes “a disturbance of memory and a 
falsification of the past,” once again, from his own experience. The experience itself dates 
from 1904: standing on the Acropolis and surveying the surrounding landscape, Freud was 
surprised by the thought that suddenly entered his mind: “So all this really does exist.” The 
“disturbance” demonstrates the extent to which surprise, or the “shock of thought” (Reik, 
1948), plays a decisive role in the innovation of the mnemic act. Freud (1936, pp. 246-247) 
goes on to explain that he had not previously “doubted the real existence of Athens. I only 
doubted whether I should ever see Athens. It seemed to me beyond the realms of possibility 
that I should travel so far…there was something about it that was wrong, that from the 
earliest times had been forbidden…the essence of success was to have got further than one’s 
father.” 
 We can summarise the “disturbance of memory” on three counts. First, imagination 
and reality exert themselves equiprimordially in the “uncanny effect” (Freud, 1919, p. 244): 
the blurred or indistinct relationship between imagination and reality is less important for our 
subjective feelings of remembering than the codetermining function of imagination and 
reality. Second, as Freud’s experience on the Acropolis demonstrates, remembering our past 
is invariably disturbing; the act of remembering and the act of perturbing are inextricably 
linked in the “uncanny effect” of temporality. Third, the creative imperative of recollective 
experience is driven by the very perturbation of the latter; we repeatedly translate (re-
describe) the unheimlich in and through the stories that we tell ourselves about our past. It is 
precisely our efforts to ward off the more disturbing feelings of derealisation that result in 
“false pronouncements about the past” (Freud, 1936, p. 244). 
 In a contemporary elaboration on this order of disturbance, Michael Parsons (2009a, 
pp. 8-9) links memory and the uncanny as follows: “staying open to what we find unheimlich, 
depends on our allowing the sum of past experience to infuse what is encountered in the 
present with unexpected, unpredictable meaning.” Parsons (2009b, p. 21) takes up and 
reworks the active conception of Freudian temporality on the basic assumption that the “work 
of remembering” invariably extends beyond recollection. In my view, Parsons and Derrida 
come to similar conclusions concerning the internal differentiation (“disturbance”) of the 
alleged spontaneity of memory. As concrete occasions for the mnemic act, “listening” is for 
Parsons what “writing” is for Derrida; listening and writing alike “bear witness to the finitude 
of the mnemic spontaneity” (Derrida, 1966, p. 228). 
 The following discussion is based on the scene of teaching (the psychoanalytic 
seminar) rather than the analytic encounter; the two situations are nonetheless inextricably 
linked. Parsons taught a seminar for a number of years at the Institute of Psychoanalysis, the 
training organisation of the British Psycho-Analytical Society, entitled “Listening to 
ourselves listening to others.” In drawing attention to listening and how to listen, Parsons tells 
us something fundamental about the way analysts work, while at the same time opening up a 
new line of inquiry in the psychoanalysis of memory. The analyst’s “evenly suspended 
attention” (Freud, 1923, p. 239) confirms that our hearing is “never a simple reception by the 
senses” (Ricoeur, 1978, p. 281). The possibility of listening presupposes an original transfer 
of meaning that has a direct bearing on the problem of memory. Experience is not first fixed 
in the memory as sensible impression, but, rather, is susceptible to the unconscious 
communication of original transference. The latter may be understood as a type of “reverie” 
(Bion, 1962) modelled on the original proximity of mother and infant. We remember as we 
listen, taking our bearings from the original relationship in which listening and being-
listened-to coexist under the conditions of primary maternal attention. 
 Essentially, Parsons links the Freudian notion of active time (the work of 
remembering) to the activity of listening-as-thinking. The link, which relies on Freud’s 
account of the uncanny, is forged experientially through various pedagogic exercises – 
including, the seminar group and group leader listening to the sounds of the night. The object 
of the solitary night-time exercise, which recalls the primal scene with the young child 
listening to the nocturnal parental couple, is to notice how much more one hears at the end of 
the designated half-hour than at the beginning. One’s hearing is thus vivified, although the 
increased sense of aliveness may be disturbing. In the weekend of the night-time exercise, 
Parsons was visiting the village where he had grown up from the age of twelve, a place the 
“deep stillness and mysterious nocturnal sounds” of which appear to evoke adolescent 
memories. The story is not sufficiently detailed for us to elaborate on any longing that the 
narrator may have had for the woods near his adolescent home. Nevertheless, there is clearly 
more to this scene than a recollection of bygone times spent wandering alone in the woods. 
Parsons does not evoke nostalgia for his younger self. Rather, “listening to listening” reveals 
at once “an uncanny time of night” (intempesta nocte) as well as a passage towards the other. 
It involves listening to oneself as another: 
 
Pondering [the night-time sounds] amongst the trees, I knew all at once that I was not 
alone. I looked around. Nobody was there. The vivid sensation persisted, however, of 
another presence. Then I understood. Beside me, watching, listening, was my 
adolescent self. I knew, of course, that there was nobody there. I was not 
hallucinating. But the sense of another human presence was distinct…and we settled 
down – myself as I am now and myself as I was then – to savour the night together. 
(Parsons, 2011, p. 53) 
 
The encounter between “two parts” of one’s life is a difficult but vital encounter in the 
affective configuration of psychic time. It becomes so (on this occasion, at least) only after 
the initial disturbance, after Parsons is out of the woods. In glancing back, Parsons fends off 
the sentimental resolution of nostalgia; he lets us see that there is something too “settled” 
about the relish with which the “we” directs its attention towards the object of the pedagogic 
exercise. The situation could all too easily be misconstrued as an encounter with one’s 
younger self. But for reasons that become increasingly clear, this would compromise the 
more radical import of the exercise. It would also reinstate a pre-Freudian notion of time. A 
premature settlement based on the rounded sufficiency and structural unity of self-identity, 
together with the adoption of a single unifying tone for past and present, would fail to register 
the very strangeness of the scene – indeed, the feeling of uncanniness. 
 Parsons tell us that driving away from the woods, he suddenly realised, with “an 
extraordinary sense of shock,” that he was not wearing his seat belt. What makes the thought 
shocking? He had no sense of having “forgotten” to put on his seat belt. He describes getting 
back into a car “that did not have seat belts.” This was “a deeply uncanny moment. I learnt to 
drive before seat belts were introduced…The ‘I’ that got into the car and drove away from the 
woods had not been my present-day ‘I,’ but the other one, the ‘I’ that was standing beside me 
in the night…The separation of past and present had collapsed, and my present-day ‘I’ 
suddenly found itself in a car that it did not know” (2011, p. 54). Parsons’s account of the 
uncanny mnemic-trace (the “uncanny moment”) rests on a creative but jarring encounter, 
involving a disruptive “collision” of past and present. The disruption of uncanny experience 
is inimical to the synthetic function of temporal perception in the phenomenological sense. At 
the same time, it does not allow for a simple augmentation of identity or self-experience. As 
in a waking dream, the sense of the past flares up as “collision” and “shock.” It is the shock 
of sensibility, as well as the reactivation of cathected mnemic traces, that determines the 
affective nature of the encounter. 
 Parsons does not come face-to-face with a mnemic image in the sense of a revived 
past experience, or a reappearance of historical life. The “mapping” of past and present on to 
each other is, in essence, a fiction. The person standing beside him in the night is not the 
narrator’s younger self. This is the case in a trivial sense, that is to say, insofar as there is 
literally no one else there. It applies more profoundly, however, with respect to an “inner 
experience” (l’experience interieure) that is not assimilable to self-experience. Retrieval is 
overdetermined by the invention of something wholly strange; something that has come to 
light but should have remained hidden and secret (Freud, 1919, p. 225). Paradoxically, what 
is found, and as such is experienced by ourselves, lies outside our grasp; we re-find 
something for the first time, something that we cannot appropriate. From the point of view of 
uncanny experience, the literal absence of another person, in Parsons’s narrative, is relatively 
banal compared to the influx of new meaning and its affective reach. Freud admits as much in 
a letter to Martha Bernays: “I always find it uncanny when I can’t understand someone in 
terms of myself” (1882; quoted in Jones, 1954, p. 352). Similarly, Freud (1919, p. 248 n 1) 
experiences feelings of uncanniness on mistaking his own reflection in a looking-glass with 
the face of another. Parsons attributes positive value to these mnemic disturbances. 
Experienced as “another human presence,” the “person” is who he is, not necessarily as a 
hallucination or a fantasy, but rather, as an imaginative construct with its own affective 
resonance. The “shock” is not only primordial and animistic – a vital unsettling excitation 
modelled on the child’s fear of the dark (Freud 1919, p. 252 n 1); but also, fictive and 
metaphorical. It is the narrative of emotional disturbance that inscribes the otherness of the 
uncanny in the very heart of experience. 
 What do we mean by “uncanny experience”? The state of mind, in this case, does not 
necessarily come under the heading of “phantasy.” The experience may be described more 
accurately as one of “illusion.” A meeting with a strangely familiar figure looms up in the 
story of the night, and the story, in turn, shapes the uncanny effect. The effect is manifest at 
various levels of articulation in language, while the initial feeling is transformed in its 
articulation. The memory-traces of sensory experience are invested, in retrospect, with new 
meaning; the act of remembering itself renders the experience-traces as meaningful 
phenomena; and, so long as the emphasis is on “making it appear,” remembering is the 
meaning of the past. In this respect, the “unity” of the acting person is given in the act of 
articulation in language. Our sense of personal identity is brought about not in the 
intentionality of temporal awareness (the phenomenological “identity” of our past, present, 
and future selves), but, rather, by the accounts that we give of ourselves in time. This is 
evident in Freud’s account of the uncanny. The structural ambivalence that Freud (1919, p. 
226) describes in the opposition of heimlich and unheimlich causes the “aesthetic” to exceed 
its own “province.” Something new comes about in the vital discordance of the uncanny 
moment, something which in its articulation refuses to settle matters on the grounds of self-
identity and historical life. 
 An accurate and perfectly efficacious description of something one imagines; 
something that evokes a perturbing amalgam of surprise, astonishment, and dissonance – the 
uncanny mnemic-trace renders the past out of kilter. The discordance, however, does not in 
any way compromise the vital significance of the encounter. The articulation of the scene is 
evidently alive with a sense of the past. And yet while indubitably manifest in its effects, the 
remembered past is “a ‘past’ that has never been present” (Derrida, 1968a, p. 21). The 
experience is “shocking” not on account of a revival of the lived past, but, rather, insofar as 
après-coup extends from the present to the immemorial past. The (absent) seat belt is not 
merely a signifier of “long ago” in the literal sense of the phrase. It is also a metaphor of a 
past that lies beyond the reach of recollection, beyond “the becoming-past of what has been 
present” (Derrida, 1968a, p. 21). The metaphoric meaning of the seat belt problematises the 
opposition of past and present, absence and presence, the interiority and exteriority of 
memory. This, at least, is how I understand the disturbance of the uncanny moment: for me it 
represents the “semantic shock” (Ricoeur, 1978, p. 296) of metaphor in the midst of living 
memory. My argument is that language creates its own disturbance, even as thought contains 
the shock of its origins. The seat belt, as I see it, shows itself not as a referent of one’s 
younger self but as the self-showing of “appearance’s apparition and luminescence” (Henry, 
1993, p. 14), the fulgur of meaning in narrative discourse. 
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How, exactly, do “collision” and “shock” disclose new meaning? One is momentarily torn 
away from oneself, uprooted in the face of the uncanny, and exposed to the presence of 
another, or to oneself as another. This raises further questions. What comes in the aftermath 
of the uncanny moment? How does disturbance disclose new possibilities? I contend that we 
make good the hints of meaning in our attempt to live with the shock of the uncanny. This 
applies to the night-time exercise presented by Parsons: in the seminar on listening, learning 
to live with the uncanny, or being-with the uncanny other, exposes the scene of teaching itself 
to “a time without tutelary present” (Derrida, 1994, p. xviii). The “other one” is never present 
as such, and yet one has an impression of something or someone, “the sense of another 
human presence.” The idea of “conviction” comes into play, here, as an articulation of an 
otherwise inaccessible primal reality. Being-with another who is never present, nor presently 
living, requires a sense of conviction. Freud elaborated at length, in Moses and Monotheism 
(1939), on the question of “conviction” – that is, with respect to the convictions of religious 
believers. For the pious believer “the idea of a single god produced such an overwhelming 
effect on men because it is a portion of the eternal truth which, long concealed, came to light 
at last and was then bound to carry everyone along with it” (Freud, 1939, p. 129). 
 Conviction applies beyond the reach of evaluative facts. The “pious solution,” in other 
words, “contains the truth – but the historical truth and not the material truth” (1939, p. 129). 
For Freud, “historical truth” does not correspond to objective reality, nor is it simply a 
phenomenon of psychic reality; it is rather a “truth” formed out of the mnemic-traces of a 
past reality. Freud (1937, p. 268) construes delusions, hallucinations, and analytic 
constructions alike as semantic acts: “The delusions of patients appear to me to be the 
equivalents of the constructions which we build up in the course of an analytic 
treatment…Just as our construction is only effective because it recovers a fragment of lost 
experience, so the delusion owes its convincing power to the element of historical truth which 
inserts in the place of rejected reality.” The hints of meaning, Freud’s fragments of “historical 
truth,” are invested with ontological significance as so many convincing constructs. In a 
sublime balance of signification, in which living-there and being-with rest on “belief in” 
(Winnicott, 1963, p. 94), the child’s fear of the dark becomes a unique song for the night. 
 I propose that “conviction” is an integral part of the projection of new meaning; that it 
involves a disclosure of new possibilities in the form of “historical truth,” something that 
“must be believed” (Freud, 1939, p. 130). Belief thus presupposes disturbances of memory; 
one holds convictions, as distinct from consciously remembered historical facts, that have 
been imaginatively constructed on disturbing grounds: “It may be eerily disturbing to find 
oneself in the grip of a process operating outside one’s awareness, but it may also open new 
inward horizons” (Parsons, 2011, p. 56-57). Parsons helps us see that believability – Freud’s 
(1939, p. 13) “justified memory” – is not a textual effect so much as an elementary form of 
imaginative living. This calls for a revision of classical metapsychology. Freud (1919, pp. 
247-252) maintained a categorical distinction not only between the “admissible” and 
“inadmissible” uncanny but also between feelings of uncanniness in everyday life and in 
literature. By contrast, Parsons (2011, p. 49) credits the value of the uncanny as a general 
phenomenon: “It is not in the end possible to divide, as Freud wished to, the uncanny as an 
aesthetic attribute of a work of art from the uncanny as a subjective experience in real life.” 
The uncanny is seen as a vital aspect of everyday life, which involves simultaneously keeping 
“oneself open to what is unheimlich” and moving “up and down the developmental pathways 
of one’s life” (2009a, p. 15). Again, this represents a subtle but radical amendment of Freud’s 
(1919, pp. 240-241) account of the animistic nature of uncanny experience. Parsons (2011, p. 
57) comments, pointedly, that even “supposing, with Freud, that uncanny experiences stem 
from a return to earlier ways of being, this need not be a withdrawal from reality, but may 
serve a purpose similar to the child’s apparent regression.” 
 Parsons credits the necessity of illusion in the English tradition of Winnicott, Rycroft, 
and Milner. At the same time, he draws on the work of César and Sára Botella, which brings 
us back to the “structural incompletion” of psychism. The dialogue here between English and 
French psychoanalysis allows us to link the truth-effect of the uncanny to the work of 
“figurability.” The imaginative elaboration of conviction is not a developmental phenomenon 
so much as an irreducible psychical event that comes about on account of the “incompletion” 
of psychic structure. César and Sára Botella forge a semantic connection between the internal 
organisation of discursive constructs and the capacity of those constructs to refer to lived 
experience. By comparing constructions in analysis with children’s fairy tales (“Once upon a 
time…”), the Botellas (2005, p. 37) place greater emphasis on the side of believability than 
on the side of “material truth,” weighing the truth-effects of one’s own convictions against 
recollection and the hidden but legible meanings of repression: “the analysand’s evolution, 
does not reside so much, as [Freud] admits himself, in the recollections it can evoke or in its 
historical reality as in the degree of conviction that arouses in the analysand.” 
 In a line of thinking that extends throughout Freud’s entire body of work, conviction 
may be seen as an extension of catharsis. The classical location of catharsis (alongside 
poiesis and mimesis) renders conviction (“belief in”) available as a way of speaking the truth 
by means of fiction. The point is not that “historical truth” is inimical to the actualities 
pertaining to the past. Our sense of the past is grounded rather in impressions that are already 
“worked over” by “an initial metaphorical impulse” (Ricoeur, 1978, p. 23). How does this 
affect the transmission of memory-traces? Again, there is no reason to assume that Parsons 
was hallucinating, or reminiscing in hysterical fashion, when, alone at night in the woods, he 
sensed another human presence beside him. The uncanny impression, however, does not 
admit of hard-and-fast distinctions – that is to say, between recollection and construction, 
time past and time present, the literal and the metaphoric. 
 As a single enveloping moment or situation of alterity, the uncanny is a source of 
“permanent disquiet” in which the “indefinite limits” of the Freudian science itself are laid 
open (de M’Uzan, 2011, p. 200). The disclosure is twofold. On the one hand, finding oneself 
in a world “without certain and defined limits” (de M’Uzan, 2009, p. 145) is obviously a 
disturbing feeling: “The sentiment of the uncanny originates…in certain themes linked to 
more or less ancient taboos. If we grant that primal experience is constituted by transgression, 
we can accept Freud’s theory as to the origin of the uncanny” (Todorov, 1975, p. 48). As 
such, the return of the repressed and castration anxiety account for the transformation of 
something frightening into something uncanny (Freud, 1919, p. 243). On the other hand, 
Todorov (1975, p. 48) goes further by linking the “sentiment” of the uncanny to its effect, 
particularly in the works of Poe and Dostoevsky: “the uncanny is not linked to the fantastic 
but to what we might call ‘an experience of limits’.” The uncanny effect operates between 
“ancient taboos” and the primary affectivity of living-there and being-with, between sexual 
drive functioning and the “self-preservative, non-instinctual dimension of identity” (de 
M’Uzan, 2009, p. 143). 
 Accordingly, Parsons presents his account of memory “between death and the primal 
scene,” where the uncanny proceeds on the one hand “from something familiar which has 
been repressed” (Freud, 1919, p. 247) and, on the other, from a feeling of “derealisation” 
(Entfremdungsgefühl) or “depersonalisation,” a feeling either that “a piece of reality” or “a 
piece of oneself” is inherently strange (Freud, 1936, pp. 244-245). The Botellas (2005, p. 37) 
also raise the question of “limits” on clinical grounds: “we wonder where the limits are – the 
conjunction and disjunction between the interpretation construction and the intervention 
fairy-tale.” The implications for the remembered past are clear – “the hallucinatory power of 
animistic thinking, intrinsic to all conviction, participates in the evocation of our most 
ordinary memoires” (2005, p. 90). The Botellas take their bearings from late Freud. Similarly, 
Parsons (2011, p. 61) credits the vital force of the uncanny in conjunction with the vital 
elements of the past, arguing that like psychoanalysis itself, the uncanny possesses an 
innovative power of disruption, that it is “subversive” above all in its potentiality: “Its nature 
is to waylay us, destabilising habitual modes of seeing both the world and ourselves, and 
offering up new ones. It carries the potential to open fresh perspectives that are closed to 
experience which stays, or is kept, too safely within existing frameworks of understanding.” 
 How is it possible for psychoanalysis to do the kind of thing Parsons claims it does? 
How does analysis realise its “subversive” power of action? The uncanny mnemic-trace 
brings this question sharply into focus. The link between the remembered past and the 
uncanny moment serves as confirmation of a general phenomenon of meaning, whose reach 
goes outside language even as it qualifies itself temporally. As Ricoeur (1978, p. 2) points 
out, language passes outside or beyond itself, precisely where “reality remains a reference, 
without ever becoming a restriction.” It is not a question of representational fidelity (holding 
a mirror to the world) so much as “another sort of reference to other dimensions of reality” 
(Ricoeur, 1978, p. 145). What is realistically true admits different meanings. Memory makes 
this clear: psychical, interior memory on the one hand and, on the other, writing, technique, 
and fiction are inextricably linked in the act of remembering. The last word belongs neither to 
psychism nor to technics. Rather, the opening of new or fresh “perspectives” involves a 
creative work at the interface of time and narrative, where, under the sublime auspice of the 
uncanny mnemic-trace, “inner experience” (l’experience interieure) itself is neither inside 
nor outside, but persistently bordering the inside and the outside. 
 Fragments, traces, and impressions are primordially connected by the propulsive force 
of metaphor; and the connective synthesis at work in the enigma of novel meaning, the 
constitutive work of “linking” (Bion, 1959), is indicative of a more extensive semantic reach 
than one finds either in the semiotic “imaginary” (the synthesis of the sign), or in the idea of 
the ego itself as “unconscious phantasy” (the synthesis of the cogito). Here, as elsewhere, 
Freud defines the subversionary import of psychoanalysis as a general theory of meaning and 
action: uncanny moments and situations are replete with feelings called up or freely evoked, 
if not established ad hoc, by “the possibilities of poetic licence.” The mnemic-trace itself 
accounts for the connotative possibilities of the narrative plēnum. What was previously 
familiar is experienced in the uncanny moment as both familiar and unfamiliar; a new 
relationship toward memory, reality, and the world comes to be in that moment. Freud (1919, 
p. 251), after all, credits the storyteller with “a peculiarly directive power” of re-description: 
“by means of the moods he can put us into, he is able to guide the current of our emotions, to 
dam it up in one direction and make it flow in another, and he often obtains a great variety of 
effects from the same material.” Finally, it is our stories that come from afar, that move us 
most profoundly and, as mementoes of our archaic heritage, repeatedly animate our most 
primitive feelings and animistic beliefs. 
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